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Democratization: the Nigerian experience
SHEHU OTHMAN AND GAVIN WILLIAMS
Since independence on in October 1960, Nigeria has been governed by military rulers for 24 years and by
civilians for nine and a half. Democratic constitutions, of both parliamentary and presidential forms, and
most recently with a distinctively parastatal character, have failed to establish a credible framework for
electoral competition and political stability.
There is a broad commitment in Nigeria to democratic forms of government. Nobody has ever
seriously attempted to establish a single-party state in Nigeria. Military regimes proclaim their commitments
to transferring power to elected governments, and risk losing power when they renege on these promises.
Nigerians have developed a complex range of institutions ofcb/U society: local and professional associations,
religious sects and organisations, trade unions, newspapers and movements promoting democracy and
defending human rights. These have been beyond the direct control of government and often come into active
opposition to them.
Colonial and military governments held elections in 1959 and in 1979 which broadly qualified as
free and fair. In 1964 and 196S, and again in 1983, civilian governments, in the federation and in the
Western Region, failed to conduct elections whose outcomes commanded general acceptance. Democracy
itself was discredited: 'Democrazy' in the rich political language of Nigeria. In 1986, the government of Gen
Ibrahim Babangida committed itself to transferring power to civilian successors on 1 October 1990.
In the following years Babangida changed the rules governing the recognition of parties and the
conduct of elections several times and twice postponed the final dates for the presidential election and the
transfer of power. On June 12 1993, the military held an election whose reported outcome is generally
accepted as a fair reflection of the preferences of voters as between the two candidates. The military then
abrogated the result This gave credence to those critics who has argued that they never intended to give up
their hold on power. It was interpreted by many Yoruba as a refusal by northerners to allow a Yoruba to
become head of state, which opened divisions between Abiola's supporters in the south-west and in the
northern states.
The present administration, under Gen Sanni Abacha, has embarked on a new round of
constitutional conferences, taking Nigeria back to 1988 (and to 1977, and to 1966, and to 1950). Elections
for conference delegates attracted a poor response from voters, particularly in the south-west. The majority
of the political class, from all parts of the country, are participating in his administrations and his
constitutional negotiations. Chief Abiola's claim to the presidency is supported by the National Democratic
Coalition, made up of politicians and retired military officers drawn mainly from the southern and especially
the Yoruba states and, ironically, by those democratic activists who opposed the procedures through which
the military finally managed the presidential nominations of Chief Abiola and Alhaji Tofa.
If Nigerians are so keen on democracy, why do they fail to achieve or to sustain a democratic
political order? The short answer is that Nigeria's political class may like democracy, but they like power
and office more. They prefer constitutional arrangements which enable them to compete for office and
allocate positions and their rewards amongst themselves to military governments which renders them into
dependent clients of soldiers. Their primary concern is to position themselves strategically for successive
rounds of the changing political game. There is no percentage for politicians, and for their clients, in their
being out of office.
Democratic elections are valued as a means of gaining access to, or maintaining control of,
positions of power. Politicians show little respect for the rules and conventions of democratic politics in their
own right. 'Polities', under civilian and military governments, is largely a matter of \vho gets what, when,
how?' For the public, government by politicians (Yoruba: ijnha asely) succeeded government by whites
(jjoba oyiabo) and alternates with government by soldiers (ijnha olnpm\ Government by the people doesn't
enter into it.
Politics, class and administration
The political history of Nigeria reveals a number of recursive themes. Access to state funds and state office was a potent
instrument of class formation. The colonial marketing boards provided the state with a mechanism for taxing exports and
the politicians with the means to pay for their policies, their political campaigns and their business activities. In the 1950s,
power was devolved to regional governments. This gave shape to political alignments and fiscal arrangements. The regional
marketing boards provided the financial basis for the regional governments and their ruling parties. After independence, and
particularly during and after the civil war, power and patronage increasingly came to exercised by the federal government,
which extended its capacity to regulate imports, exports and the exchange of currencies. In the 1970s mineral oil exports
replaced agricultural, exports as the major source of foreign exchange and state revenue, consolidating federal domination
of the import-export economy and the profits and revenues extracted from it. Political competition within and between states
turned on their capacity to claim a share of mineral oil revenues and to distribute them. The creation of new states meant
that political coalitions had to be built on coalitions of state based interests. Regional networks persisted, but they could no
longer rely on regional governments to secure their political support. Politicians from each of the three dominant language
groups, and from the former regional 'minorities' were divided by rivalries for local and state office and national positions,
and differences of strategies through which to advance their own careers and the interests of their groups.
A series of colonial and military regimes sponsored transitions to elected government. They began with
constitutional conferences, indirectly elected from local government constituencies. The colonial/ military regime determined
the shape of the constitution and secured the agreement of the political class to their proposals. Politicians invoked
constitutional principles in order to serve their own political strategies. They showed little respect for laws or conventions
and exploited all the resources at their disposal, constitutional and extra-constitutional to gain access to and maintain their
hold on power. Political elites reached compromises from time to time. These were not the outcome of an attempt to identify
shared goals and establish agreed principles, but rather the result of recognising the current balance of forces.
The 1979 constitution, and its successor, recognised that politics in Nigeria was concerned with the allocation of
scarce resources, not to alternative ends but to different people. They mobilised resources in order to be elected to political
office, and treated political office as a source of bounty which would repay their investments, rewards their clients and fund
their continuing political campaigns. The refusal of the politicians in power to subject themselves to the test of competitive
elections lead to the collapse of the first Republic'. The 1983 elections in the different states were determined by the ability
of the ruling NPN to impose its claims to some states, and its willingness to concede others to its opponents. The choice
of governors was the outcome of the rivalries among regional blocs within the NPN, concerned to position themselves for
the following elections in 1987. Their manipulations destroyed such political credit as the Civilian government could claim
and left the path open for a further military intervention.
Successive military governments have sought to solve Nigeria's problems by unifying administration under military
auspices and bringing order and discipline to society and politics. The parade ground approach proved ineffective in
adderssing economic crises, political conflict or social order. Military rulers relied on civil servants and aligned with and
coopted politicians to serve their regimes. They soon acquired a taste for the benefits of office, which provided the means
for establishing themselves in commerce, industry, finance and gentleman fanning and of launching their own political
careers. The turnover of military and civilian administrations as a result of coups and transfers of power created scope for
promotions within both the armed services and the civil service, and sustained high expectations of social mobility and
access to the rewards of high office. The political class, replenished from time to time by new recruits from business and
universities, as well as the military and the civil service, resented the control of power by military officers whom they
regarded as less competent and less entitled to rule than themselves. Hence their consistent support for a return to civilian
rule. In the meantime they sought to position themselves most effectively for the contest for political office and depended
on the military to make it possible for them to return to power. Military governments need to offer the prospect of a return
to civilian rule and find themselves outsted, by other soldiers, when they renounce their intention to leave office. By coopting
politicians into the political process, they are able to extend their period of office and control their succession. Trade unions
have resisted government economic policies and repressive practices. National strikes have provided a means of pursuing
workers demands and have sometimes acted as a focus for popular opposition to a repressive and exploitative regime.
Governments have acceeded to their immediate economic demands without making concessions to their political objectives.
Three aspects of politics may be distinguished: politics as the allocation of scarce resources, politics as the pursuit
of public policy, and politics as the process of class conflict. In Nigeria, the competition for scarce resources has displaced
class politics: popular demands force their way on to the political stage in the forms of workers strikes and local rural
rebellions but are rarely incorporated into the competition of parties. Considerations of public policy give way time again
to calculations of political and economic advantage. Democratic poliical competition can only operate within an accepted
framework of rules and conventions. The unconstrained pursuit of power, by military rulers and their civilian rivals,
continues to stand in the way of the establishment of a democratic political order.
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Nationalists, the stale and regional politics: 1939-59.
Nigerian politicians may have had little love for Kwame Nkrumah, but they certainly appreciated and acted
on his advice to 'Seek ye first the political kingdom.' Nationalists sought to gain control of the colonial state,
firstly as a means of gaining access to the resources from which they had been excluded by European firms
and Levantine traders and by an alien government. Secondly, the control of the state enabled them to decide
which Nigerians would get access to these resources.
Nigeria is a colonial construct. Its external and internal boundaries and railway and road networks
have given shape to patterns of economic activities and to the formation of a plurality of overlapping
political and linguistic identities within local, state, regional and national arenas. The northern and southern
provinces were amalgamated in 1914 under the common authority of the Governor(-General) but retained
their distinctive forms of administration. From the colonial period onwards, Western education expanded far
more rapidly in the southern provinces than in the north and, in the north, among Christians in the 'middle
belt' than among Muslims in the far north'. The separation of the eastern and western provinces in 1939
created three regions. Each region was deraographically dominated by a single language group, the Yoruba
in the West, the Igbo in the East and the Hausa-Fulani in the north, and incorporated numerous 'minorities'
(including the Anioma Igbo in the West, and the Yoruba of Uorin and Kabba in the north).
In Nigeria, the export-import trade offered the most accessible target for nationalist ambitions. In
the colonial period, it was dominated by a limited range of staple lines of exports and imports, and a small
number of foreign companies, notably the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch
Unilever combine. The monopolistic practices were a target of national hostility and popular resentments
when world commodity prices fell in 1921, in 1929, in 1931, in 1934 and again in 1937. In 1939 the
colonial government took over the purchase and export of cocoa, followed by oilseeds in 1942. State export
monopolies provided an effective way of keeping prices down, reducing demands for imports, earning dollars
for the sterling area and raising taxes for the government. They were therefore perpetuated with the creation
of commodity marketing boards for export crops in 1946 and 1947. Opposition to the marketing boards from
African trading interests was undercut by granting them licenses to sell produce to the boards. The marketing
boards were justified by the need to regulate markets and to stabilize prices and later, by Fabian economists,
as a means of financing industrial development. They provided the foundations for a political economy
centred on securing access to the state as a means of controlling markets marketing boards
Nigeria's first national political party, the National Convention of Nigeria and The Cameroons (after
independence, National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, NCNC) was formed in 1944. It drew a response
from a range of people in the urban centres of the southern provinces and even from some towns in the
north. Trade union demands for higher wages in response to war-time and post-war inflation lead to a
general strike by public sector workers in 194S and subsequent strikes in the Enugu coal fields in 1949, and
by UAC workers in 1950 and 1931. Farmers in the Ibadan area resisted the compulsory culling out of cocoa
tress infected by swollen shoot. In a period of rationing of basic imports and official control on price,
African traders and consumers resented the monopolistic trading practices of colonial firms which at various
times became the targets of violent attacks in the Niger Delta and the Eastern Region. Radical nationalists in
the Zikist movement, named for Dr Azikiwe, the NCNC leader, embarked on an unsuccessful campaign to
mobilize popular opinion behind radical nationalist demands.
Populist nationalism was undermined by the incorporation of the rising political class into a process
of constitutional reform directed by the colonial government. In 1950, delegates to the first national
constitutional conference were elected indirectly from 'native authorities' and local councils. In 1951,
parliaments were elected for each of three regions. The NCNC won overwhelmingly in the East. In the
Western House of Assembly, the Action Group (AG), formed in 1950, secured the support of a majority of
members, at the expense of the NCNC. In the Northern Assembly, the Northern People's Congress (NPQ,
whose political base was founded in the native authorities, took most seats to the exclusion of the populist
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). Both the AG and NPC were founded as regional parties.
They grew out cultural associations designed to bring modern and traditional elites and aimed to gain control
of regional governments and their resources. Each party maintained control of its region in subsequent
elections up to 1961 through a combination of patronage, coercion and appeals to ethnic sentiments.
In 1953, a new round of constitutional negotiations created a federal constitution. The commodity
marketing boards were reorganised into regional marketing boards and a fiscal commission provided for the
allocation of a significant share of state revenues, including mineral rents and royalties, according to the
principle of 'derivation'. Despite rising taxation of export earnings, agricultural exports continued to expand
up to the civil war. In 1965 Nigeria was the world's largest exporter of groundnuts and palm produce and
second, after Ghana, as an exporter of cocoa. The regional marketing boards provided the fiscal basis for
expanding development spending and government employment, party political activities, and private business
activities. The reformation of state institutions proved to be a powerful agent of class formation. Rising real
wages, expanding education, high agricultural prices and wider commercial opportunities blunted radical
demands. Popular politics were assimilated into the politics of patronage. The style of political appeals is
exemplified by the AG slogan: LIFE MORE ABUNDANT.
The primary concern of the NPC was to protect the interests of 'One North' from the competition in
commerce and jobs of better-educated southerners, particularly Igbo. Given the north's demographic
majority, they could dominate the federal government as long as they could ensure the political unity of the
north. The Yoruba leaders of the AG wanted to bring modern and traditional elites together to resist the Igbo
challenge to the historic lead of the Yoruba in education and commerce. In the East, the NCNC
consolidated its support in the Igbo-speaking areas, and among the non-Yoruba 'mid-westem' provinces of
the Western region, but alienated political elites in the non-Igbo areas of the East.
In 1954, the leaders of the three major parties, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (NPC), Dr
Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNQ and Obafemi Awolowo (AG) were each Prime Ministers of their respective
regions. The federal government, an NPC-NNDP coalition, was lead by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, deputy
leader of the NPC. The 1957 constitutional conference agreed, under British direction, to keep the three
regions intact as the NPC demanded. The AG and NCNC wanted the regions to be divided into new states,
but could not agree on the number of states to be created or where their boundaries should be. The Willink
Commission was asked to inquire into the grievances of "minorities'. In 1957 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
invited two AG ministers, SO Akintola and Ayo Rosiji to join the federal coalition. It looked as though
Nigeria could be governed by a cartel of regional leaders in a government of national unity. However, the
NCNC were not ready to concede control of the West to the AG and relinquish the claim of their supporters
in the mid-West to their own region. Chief Awolowo sought to build a national coalition by aligning with
politicians from the 'minorities' in the north and east, in which he was partially successful; most northern
'minorities' preferred to seek the protection of the NPC and its defence of 'One North'. This strategy brought
the AG into conflict with one of the other parties in each of the three regions. In the 1959 federal elections,
the AG won more than half their seats in the North and East, but still took only third place behind the NPC
and the NCNC.
During the 1950s, ruling parties consolidated control.over power and patronage within their own
regions. A certain accommodation of regional interests took place, which was partly undermined by the
competition of the major parties and their affiliates within each region. After independence, the Federal
government acquired ultimate authority over regional governments and increased its share of state funds. The
allocation of power at all levels came to be dependent on conflicts within the federal arena.
Politicians, coups and civil war, 1960-1970
After the 1959 federal election, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa formed a coalition government with the
NCNC, whose leader, Dr Azikiwe, became Governor-General (and President when Nigeria became a
Republic in 1963). Chief Awolowo became Leader of the Opposition and Chief Akintola became Premier of
the West. Dr Okpara took over as Premier in the East. The federal government which created a Central Bank
and extended Us capacity to borrow money and regulate imports and financial markets. Federal government
spending favoured the Northern Region, whose share of revenues increased. The AG took the precaution of
calling an election in the West in 1960, before independence. It adopted a more radical posture and
committed itself in 1961 to 'Democratic Socialism', which amounted mainly to expanding education and
promoting African capitalism. In I960, and again in 1965, the AG's Tiv supporters in Benue Province in the
North came into armed conflict with the Tor Tiv and the Tiv Native Authority which they saw as an agent
on the oppressive NPC government.
In 1962 the AG split between the supporters of Awolowo and Akintola. Awolowo sought to keep
control of party, and thus regional government, funds which were necessary to support his strategy of
building a national opposition. Akintola did not approve of using the resources of the West to fund a weak
opposition in the other regions or see why the AG should exclude itself from access to federal patronage. His
supporters caused a fracas in the Western House of Assembly to prevent the Governor from appointing
Alhaji Adegbenro to replace him, which gave the federal government an excuse to declare a state of
emergency. Chief Awolowo and his supporters, including Joseph Tarka, the Tiv leader, were subsequently
tried and imprisoned for treason. This opened the way to the creation of a new Mid-Western Region, which
elected Dennis Osadebay of the NCNC as ils Premier. Chief Akintola persuaded enough AG MHA's to join
the winning side. He first formed first a coalition government with the NCNC and then launched a new
party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) with a virulently anti-Igbo platform. Their position
in the federal government had allowed the NCNC to gain control of a second region at the cost of
surrendering most of their support in the Yoruba-speaking West to Akintola.
The NCNC were increasingly dissatisfied with its junior status in the federal coalition and NPC
direction of state investment and spending to the Northern Region. They looked to the 1962 census to alter
the demographic balance between north and south, and both the East and the West helped the process along.
The North responded by 'verifying' its own tally to bring it into line. A further census, in 1963, inflated
regional totals all round and maintained the political status quo. The NCNC formed a new coalition, the
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) with the AG and NEPU to challenge its senior partners, the NPC
and their allies, including the NNDP, in the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). In June 1964, rival trade
union organisations united in support of a general strike for full payment of wage increases recommended by
the Morgan Commission and against politicians of all parties.
The 1964 election campaign was marked by intimidation, particularly in the North where two
UPGA candidates were killed and others prevented from submitting their nomination papers. When it became
clear that the NNA's majority could not be overturned, the UPGA called an election boycott. The boycott
was total in the East where NCNC controlled the government and in three of four seats in Lagos. The
government of the newly-created Mid-West called off the boycott, b the West the boycott enabled NNDP
candidates to win seats on a low poll and the NPC won all but four seats in the North. The NCNC looked to
President Azikiwe to cancel the elections, but the chiefs of staff followed the Prime Minister's lead. A
compromise was now reached. A national government was formed including NCNC and NNDP ministers
and a further election' was held to fill seats in the East and Lagos. The parties of government each
maintained control in their regional fiefs, to the exclusion of the AG. Politicians demonstrated their solidarity
with the holders of power and patronage.
The AG now looked to the 1965 regional election to regain control of the West. NNDP Deputy
Premier, Remi Fani-Kayode, declared on the eve of the election that, whichever way you vote, we shall be
in power after the elections. And so it proved. The election was followed by political violence in which party
thugs made their own vicious contribution - wet-and-bum - to the discourse and technology of political
murder. Politicians had lost their legitimacy and their control of the means of violence.
On 15 January 1966, a group of majors killed the Premiers of the Federation, the North and the West
and senior northern military officers. They were generally better educated than their older superiors and saw
themselves as saving Nigeria from the moral turpitude and profiteering into which the politicians had taken
the country. However, the coup failed. Power was transferred to General [ronsi, head of the army and, like
most of the coup-makers, an Igbo from the Eastern Region. Young northern civil servants and intellectuals
organised northern opinion against the new regime. The new military government tried to apply the military
virtues of discipline, hierarchy and central command to the ills of regionalism and corruption. On 24 May,
Ironsi issued a decree which abolished the regions, which became 'groups of provinces', and unified the
public service. Northerners interpreted the decree as a means of displacing them from official positions by
better-educated southerners. Student demonstrations in Zaria were followed by attacks on Igbos in the main
commercial centres of the North. On the night of 29 July 1966, northern soldiers murdered Ironsi and Lt Col
Fajuyi, Military Governor of the West, in Ibadan and killed eastern officers and soldiers in the northern and
western barracks. Only in Enugu, in the East, was a truce negotiated. Federal civil servants and UK and US
diplomats persuaded Northern officers and soldiers to abandon their demand for separation. A Christian
northerner, Lt Col Gowon became head of the government and Supreme Commander of the Army. Lt Col
Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, did not recognise Gowon as Supreme Commander. The
leaders of the AG, including Awolowo and Tarka, were finally released from jail.
Representatives of the four regions and Lagos met at a constitutional conference in September. Initially
the East and the North favoured a 'confederal' solution and maintenance of their regional integrity. The West,
Lagos and the Mid-West preferred a federal government and the creation of new states. All agreed that the
army be reorganised into regional units. On 20 September the North changed its position to favour a federal
government and accept the creation of new states, under pressure from 'middle-belt' soldiers from the
Northern minorities and younger officers, academics and civil servants who recognised the economic and
political weakness of a separate North. On 28 September soldiers and civilians took part in a renewed wave
of attacks on Igbos across the North, killing perhaps 8,000 people and leading to an exodus of a million
people to the East. The constitutional conference adjourned on 3 October; the East did not return.
From October 1966 to May 1967, Ojukwu and the government of Eastern Nigeria pursued three related
strategies. One was to negotiate a confederal solution, which would give them control of their own territory,
security and resources, while sharing common services with the rest of Nigeria. The second was outright
secession. The third was to form an alliance with the West, itself threatened by Northern dominance of the
army, which would lead to separation of the North from the southern regions. The first strategy
complemented the second. If confederation could not be negotiated, eastern Nigeria would secede, and
doubts among senior officers and civil servants quelled. The strategy of detaching the West from the North
fitted uneasily with the pursuit of Eastern autonomy or independence, and would depend on the actions of
westerners. The federal government followed two alternative strategies. One was to try to meet Eastern
demands for security and control of their own region while maintaining the ultimate authority of the federal
government. The other, pressed by federal civil servants, was to bring civilians into the government, restore
its exclusive and concurrent powers, and create new states.
The Supreme Military Council, including Ojukwu, met on 4-5 January 1967 at Aburi in Ghana, where
they agreed that the army be organised under regional commands, arid that decisions be made by the SMC or
with the 'concurrence' on the Military Governors. Agreement was reached by not dealing with the fine print.
Ojukwu announced that Aburi had gone a long way towards confederalism, which was just what the federal
civil servants feared. Ojukwu demanded implementation of Aburi in full and rejected a federal proposal
which would have allowed three of four regional governors to approve a state of emergency. Attempts by
Chief Awolowo and others to mediate proved ineffective. On 27 May, Gowon decreed a state of emergency
and the division of the regions into twelve states. Six were from the North, three from the West and three
were from the East. The largest of the eastern states, East-Central, was almost entirely Igbo, the smaller two,
Rivers and South East, mainly non-Igbo. Ojukwu declared the 'Republic of Biafra' independent on 30 May
1967.
In July 1967, the Nigerian Army invaded from the north and from the sea. Biafran forces entered the
Mid-West, with the connivance of mid-western Igbo officers, but were checked at Ore in the West and
driven back across the Niger. The leaders of the mid-western adventure sought to remove Ojukwu and
negotiate a cease-fire and were executed for plotting against him. Enugu, the Biafran capital fell on 4
October. Nigerian forces soon took control of most of the 'minority' areas of the new Rivers and South-
Eastem States, and denied Biafra access to the coast. Relief and arms had henceforth to be Sown in to Biafra
by air.
Biafra continued for two more years to defend a small and densely-populated area, linked by a network
of roads, while Nigeria attacked from three fronts whose commanders communicated only through Lagos.
Arms from France and medicine and relief supplies from charities allowed Biafra to prolong its resistance,
but never gave it any chance of winning the war. Biafra won the propaganda war, but Nigeria won the
diplomatic war. This ensured its international recognition and access to British and Soviet weapons. War did
not end negotiations. Neither side wished to appear intransigent. Throughout the series of meetings in
different countries, each side kept to its conditions. Nigeria insisted on an end to secession and acceptance of
the twelve states. Biafra demanded a cease-fire and return to its pre-war boundaries. Neither had any
intention of settling the matter by negotiation, except on their own terms. Finally, Biafran resistance
collapsed and Maj. Gen. Effiong surrendered on 12 January 1970.
Politics was a game of winner takes all. Consequently, politicians used all their resources, constitutional
and extra-constitutional, to gain and maintain control of office. In the 1950s politicians were able to
compromise on constitutional issues and on the allocation of revenues among regions because all gained
access to something, though some gained more than others. After independence in 1960, they competed for
shares of the same, limited resources. Negotiators each sought to protect sectional gains, not to arrive at a
solution to common problems. Compromise amounted to no more than backing down in the face of superior
force. People resorted to political violence, whether against local agents of government or against outsiders,
when changes in control of government, at the federal and regional levels, appeared to threaten the access of
members of particular communities to opportunities and resources within their own territories, and to
symbolise their political humiliation.
Oil, state reformation and constitutional reform, 1970-1979
After the civil war, the volume and price of mineral oil exports expanded dramatically. The allocation and
spending of oil revenues, and the distribution of the imports it generated came to dominate political life.
Industrial investment by Nigerian and foreign firms and domestic food production by small farmers increased
in response to rising demand. Agricultural exports fell disastrously, to zero in the case of groundnuts and
palm oil, as producer prices fell behind the rate of inflation and the expansion of opportunities in other
sectors of the economy, including food production for the domestic market.
The direction of policy and control of revenues was concentrated increasingly in the hands of the
federal government. At the September 1966 constitutional conference, representatives of the four regions met
to determine the future of Nigeria. The federal government appeared to be able to do little more than hold
the ring. Following the adjournment of the conference, the political initiative on the federal side passed into
the hands of a group of civil servants, who came to be known as the 'super permsecs.' They centralised fiscal
authority in the federal government. Between 1966 and 1979, the revenue allocation scheme was altered six
times. These changes sharply increased the share of revenues spent directly by the federal government and
reduced dramatically the share of oil revenues accruing directly to the region from which they originated.
The federal government reclaimed responsibility for the agricultural marketing boards, though as most of
them bought little and generated no revenue, it hardly mattered. States now depended for most of their
revenue on the allocation of money from the Distributable Pool Account, divided partly on the basis of
population and partly on the basis of an equal share for each state. This made it even more difficult to
produced an agreed population census and encouraged the multiplication of demands for new states.
In order to save foreign currency and encourage local industrial production during and after the war,
the Gowon government controlled imports. It did not follow Britain's devaluation of the pound and restricted
the convertibility of the currency. It acquired ownership of a substantial share of the oil industry and passed
legislation to reserve specific economic activities to Nigerians and require foreign firms to transfer 40 or 60
percent of their equity to Nigerian shareholders. These measures were designed to increase national control
over the economy. They increased the state's ability to allocate opportunities, exacerbated import dependency,
provoked sectional conflicts over the regional distribution of shares in foreign enterprises and rewarded
corruption. Arms purchases, for both sides during the civil war, and governments contracts laid the basis for
substantial private fortunes and subsequent political ambitions. Cocoa fanners in the Ibadan area rebelled
against war-time taxes, official extortion and low cocoa prices. Workers had to be content with the 1970
Adebo award, which provoked strikes in support of demands for its extension to the public sector.
In 1970 the Gowon government promised to transfer power to an elected government in 1976. It
committed itself to an ambitious program of political reform and national reconstruction, defined by a
leading civil servant, Allison Ayida as a 'national revolution' with the states-men of the civil service as a
surrogate vanguard. This was resisted by the northern intelligentsia who, with others in the political class,
resented the power of the 'super permsecs'. The Gowon government failed to implement its own program -
most blatantly in the case of the national census which spectacularly inflated the figures for the four most
northern states. In 1974, it postponed the transfer of power indefinitely. Oil revenues flowed into government
and corruption escalated as federal and state governments spent their largesse and those in power took their
share while the going was good. Government committed itself to ambitious programmes to expand primary
education, build roads, improve telecommunications, produce steel and fertilisers and irrigate large areas in
the far northern states. State and federal parastatals multiplied in profusion. Gowon's attempt to buy political
support by backdating the 1974 wage awards by nine months provoked a renewed round of strikes and
accelerating inflation. On 29 July 1975, the military removed the federal and state government. General
Murtala Muhammed, from Kano state, replaced Gowon, whose family came from Plateau State. Permanent
secretaries were banished from meetings of the Federal Executive Council unless specifically invited. The
new military governors continued to be serving officers under central command. Murtala's government
established the centralised military government envisaged by Ironsi, but this time under northern control.
Murtala committed his government to transfer power in 1979 to a civilian government. Murtala was
assassinated in an unsuccessful coup in 1976 and replaced by Gen Obasanjo. Ibrahim Babangida played a
courageous part in bringing the coup to an end. Lt Col Shehu Yar-adua was promoted to Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters. Murtala's Minister of Defence and contemporary, Maj Gen Bisalla, and a number of
middle-rank officers, mainly from Plateau and southern Zaria, were executed for their part in the plot.
Murtala had already set in motion a series of reforms: the 1973 census results were rejected; seven new
states were created in 1977; in the same year trade unions were restructured into industrial unions and a
single Nigerian Labour Congress under government direction. The government maintained a high exchange
rate of the naira in order to try and control inflation and to the benefit of those with access to foreign
exchange and imported commodities. Rising government spending generated a continued rise in imports.
They were partly checked when oil prices fell in 1977 by cutting government spending and introducing
import licences and advanced deposits against letters of credit. Students campaigned against rising costs and
several were killed in Zaria when the army was called in to deal with them.
The constitutional drafting committee recognised that politics in Nigeria was concerned with the
allocation of scarce resources, and recommended a presidential constitution as a means of regulating political
competition. Local government elections were held and an indirectly elected Constituent Assembly approved
a new constitution, which was amended by the military. The Constituent Assembly provided an opportunity
for politicians to form new coalitions in preparation for the elections. Northern interests had been able to
dominate the first republic through their control of the Native Authorities and the NA police and courts, and
of the Northern Region. The military had brought the NA police and courts under the state governments into
which the region had been divided. A new basis was needed if a coalition of northern interests was to regain
the dominant position it held in the first republic. The institutions of the former government of the Northern
Region such as the New Nigerian newspaper, the New Nigerian Development Corporation, and the Interim
Common Services Agency provided a base for the network of members of the northern intelligentsia who
7came to be widely known as the 'Kaduna mafia'. The core of this group began their careers in the northern
bureaucracy under the patronage of the Sardauna of Sokoto. They established close links in the army and
moved into the federal government, industry and took up gentlemen farming. They took the lead, as we
noted, in opposing Ironsi's unification decree and opposed the 'super permsecs' who ran the Gowon
government. They tended to come from the provincial towns of the north rather than the major cities of
Sokoto or Kano; hence their link to Kaduna, founded by Lord Lugard as colonial capital of the Northern
Region. They saw the forthcoming elections as their chance to assume their rightful position in the national
political order. They were active at the Constituent Assembly in raising the issue of the status of appeals
from sharia courts in the northern states. The issue was used to mobilise a bloc of support around a symbolic
issue of Islamic commitment. At the same time it put the supporters of a separate Sharia Court of Appeal
directly at odds with Christians, and especially northern Christians in the Constituent Assembly. The military
government finally insisted that the issue be dropped, which in turn weakened the political position of the
'mafia'.
The new constitution followed the model of the United States in the election of a president and state
governors. Their periods of office were coterminous with the bicameral national and unicameral state
legislatures. Ministers were not to be members of, nor responsible to, the legislatures. Parties were to be
registered and regulated by the Federal Electoral Commission, who would have to be satisfied that they were
nationally organised. People elected for one party could not switch their allegiance to another. Election to
office required a plurality of voters nationally, or across the state, as well as the support of a quarter of the
electorate in two-thirds of the states, or local government areas. Public bodies were required to reflect the
federal character of the country' in making appointments. Forrest points out that the constitution emphasised
the duties of the state towards individuals rather than the rights, including rights to property of individuals.
Public officials were to declare their assets and institutions set up to enforce a code of conduct. The
Constituent Assembly failed to resolve the question of revenue allocation. Although each state had its own
claim for more favoured treatment, they key issue was the demand of politicians of all parties for a larger
share of revenues to go the states, the point of access for most of them to a share of public funds. They
therefore rejected the report of the Aboyade Technical Committee which sought to balance revenues against
expenditure commitments. The military left the question open for the new government.
FEDECO recognised five parties, four of which had clear origins in the parties of the first republic,
but with some significant changes in political alignments. Each party was a coalition of largely state-based
interests, working within broader regional and national networks. Politicians from each of the major language
groups were divided over state and regional policies and how the interests of their group could best be
protected at the national level. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) rightly saw itself, as Joseph put it, as
the 'natural party of government'. Its core was a coalition of northern interests, to which it attracted
spokesmen for southern and northern minorities and taen of timber and calibre' from the Yoruba- and Igbo-
speaking areas. Shehu Shagari, a NPC minister in the first Republic was chosen as presidential candidate,
defeating Adamu Ciroma, the preferred choice of the Kaduna mafia. Their time had not come. The Unity
Party of Nigeria (UPN) grew out of the Committee of Friends organised under the aegis of Chief Awolowo.
Although it was successful in extending its support from the Yoruba-speaking provinces to Bendel Province,
it failed to form a nation-wide alliance and Awolowo lost the support of several prominent non-Yoruba
leaders of the AG, notably the Tiv leader, Joseph Tarka who threw in his lot with the NPN. From the Club
of 19 [states] came the aim of constructing a majority of minorities, including the Igbo who had been
marginalised from power in the post-civil war period. Rivalries over leadership split this prospective
coalition between the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), which in the south drew particularly on former
supporters of the NCNC and nominated Dr Azikiwe for the Presidency, and the Greater Nigerian People's
Party, led and financed by Waziri Ibrahim, a former NPC Defence Minister, from Bomu State. The People's
Redemption Party inherited the radical Muslim tradition of NEPU and the support of younger radicals from
the northern universities. Its leader, Alhaji Aminu Kano, had originally aligned himself with the NPN, but
found himself excluded from consideration for national office and party influence. The NIX was forbidden
to support political parties. The Nigerian left could only created regionally-based groups. Socialists joined
either the PRP or the UPN, or remained aloof from the electoral process.
President Shagari and the NPN gained the most votes, and seats in the federal elections, and seven
state governorships. It won the governorship in two of the four states with Hausa majorities and in five states
dominated by former regional 'minorities', including the Tiv of Benue State. The concern to be on the
winning side persuaded many "minorities' politicians to support the NPN and thus ensured its victory. Fast
arithmetic footwork was needed to secure Shagari the required quarter of two-third of the votes in the
thirteenth, of nineteen, states, an argument upheld by the military government and the supreme court. The
strength of the other opposition parties was limited to a few states. The states in the formerly divided West
all gave overwhelming support to the UFN, a tribute to the popularity of Awolowo's promise of free and
universal secondary education and the dislike of the former NNDP government in the West. The NPP won
both Igbo-majority states and Plateau, and the GNPP the north-eastern states of Bomu and Gongola. In all
states except Lagos, the NPN came first or second. It alone could claim national support.
Like its colonial predecessor, the military government directed the transition to elected government,
shaped the constitution and installed its preferred successor in power. The constitution was expressly
designed to avoid the pitfalls which had brought the first republic to an end. It would prove no more
successful in constraining politicians and securing the conditions for democratic government.
Parties, politics and coups, 1979-1983
The American-style constitution of the Second Republic was expressly designed for Nigerians. State
regulation sought to promote national rather than sectional parties and to ensure that state largesse was
broadly spread and avoid the winner-takes all pattern of the British parliamentary system. The American
constitution can only work with parties in the American mould. Nigerians followed the more partisan
practices of Britain, and Nigeria. Politics turned on the distribution of oil resources among politicians and
their clients at national, state and local levels.
The NPN formed a government in Lagos with the support of the third largest party, the NPP,
recreating in some respects the NPC-NCNC alliance of the previous parliamentary system. The NPN-NPP
alliance broke down when NPP governors joined other opposition governors in protesting against the
appointment of Presidential Liaison Officers to state capital, where they could act as a focus for NPN
patronage fNPN Governor1) and in the continuing battle over the division of revenue between federal, state
and local governments, and other special claims. In order to pass his revenue allocation proposals, which
gave the federal government 55 per cent (down from 76 per cent in 1979) and the states 26.5.per cent (up
from 21 per cent in 1979), Shagari secured the support of some members of the NPN, the GNPP and the
PRP who preferred to cooperate with the ruling party. This proved insufficient to secure the legislation, as
the Supreme Court vetoed a bill passed only by a joint committee of the two Houses, and made possible by
displacing one PRP member of the committee by one favourable to the bill. A further compromise gave the
states directly 30.5 per cent and was passed. The conflict had split the three smaller opposition parties into
pro- and anti-NPN factions. Only the largest opposition party, the UPN, remained united under Awolowo's
leadership. It lost leading members to the NPN in 1983 when Awolowo insisted that incumbent governors all
be renominated, denying their deputies and other rivals a chance to take over their posts. All parties did
agree on the need to create a plethora of new states, which would multiply the points of access to a share of
the oil revenues. They could not, however, agree on boundaries and state capitals, so no new states were
created.
In one state, Kaduna, a PRP governor, Balarabe Musa, was confronted by an NPN legislature, which
refused to approve his nominees for ministerial position. He therefore tried to carry out his policies through
his Chief Secretary, a radical academic, Bala Usman, without the benefit of ministers. The PRP wished to
attack directly their opponents power base, the 'native authority' structure and its control over taxation and
land rights. Lacking parliamentary procedures for votes of confidence, the NPN resorted to the procedure for
impeachment to bring him down, giving ideas for other legislators to use against governors and deputies of
their own parties. Political violence broke out between interests supported by the NPN and the governing
parties in Kano, Bomu and Oyo States. Police killed farmers at Bakalori, Sokoto state, who protested against
their displacement by the Bakalori irrigation scheme. They failed to control political violence in opposition
states or to deal effectively with a series of risings in Kano, Kaduna and Bomu by a millennial sect, the 'Yan
Tatsine.
In 1980, rising oil revenues allowed the government to increase the import of consumer goods and
expand its spending commitments. A general strike secured another round on wage increases in 1981. The
fall in the world oil price in 1981, with little realistic prospect of recovery, did not constrain spending.
Federal and state governments committed themselves to expenditures well beyond their revenues on
infrastructural, agricultural development and irrigation schemes. The federal government approved the foreign
exchange spending to which the states committed themselves. Mobilisation funds were paid out for contracts
which were never begun. Arson destroyed evidence of corruption in government ministries. Governors
appropriated large sums for their personal use and party war chests. Balarabe Musa (cited Usman 1984)
described the system as a 'Contractocracy' - a government of contractors, for contractor and by contractors.
Scarcities of commodities generated profits for those with access to import licences and foreign exchange.
Policy making was subordinated to the priorities of allocating benefits. Commercial activities were oriented
towards realising profits in foreign currencies. The overvalued exchange rate and the regime of exchange and
import controls created a massive boom in illegal trade with neighbouring countries. The government's only
policy response to the collapse of the oil boom was the forcible expatriation of some two million foreign
workers, of whom about half were Ghanaian.
The prospects of election in 1993 divided governing and opposition parties alike. The Federal
Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and the police found opportunities to demonstrate their partisanship. In
1979, the NPN had shared their top position among nominees from different zones of the country. This gave
rise to the demand that positions, including the 19S7 presidential candidacy, should rotate among zones, a
suggestion which was strongly resisted by the Kaduna mafia. Chief Abiola, head of ITT Nigeria, left the
NPN because it appeared to be unwilling to allow a Yoruba to run for president in 1987. He had himself in
mind. The Kaduna mafia found themselves to be excluded from control of patronage by Shagari, Umaru
Dikko, and the Vice-President, Alex Ekwueme and his associates. They were frustrated by the incompetence
of the government and its consequences for their business enterprises. They negotiated an alliance with their
long-standing rival, Chief Awolowo in 1983, but to little electoral effect. National control of patronage and
power kept the NPN largely intact. The opposition parties were more divided. FEDECO recognised the pro-
NPN faction of the PRP as legitimate. Governor Rimi of Kano aligned himself with the NPP, Balarabe Musa
with the UPN. FEDECO refused to register, as the Progressive People's Party (PPP), an alliance of the NPP
with sections of the PRP and GNPP, but did recognise a sixth contender, the Nigerian Advance Party in the
hope of weakening the UPN vote in the south-west. A broader alliance, including the UPN, could not get off
the ground because of their inability to agree on a common presidential candidate. In 1982, both Gowon and
Ojukwu were allowed to return from exile. Qjukwu came back to a hero's welcome from Igbo supporters and
declared his support for the NPN, to the chagrin of leading figures in the military and the Kaduna mafia. His
presence on the NPN ticket made it more difficult for the opposition parties to agree on a presidential
candidate, and particularly on Chief Awolowo whom many Igbo believed had betrayed them in the period
just before the civil war. Awolowo was determined to run for the presidency. The founding fathers of the
NCNC and the AG, Dr Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo ran for the NPP and the UPN respectively, hoping that
Shagari would not get sufficient support in enough states to be elected on the first ballot. The failure to find
an electable opposition ticket ensured Shagari's victory. FEDECO reversed the order of elections, so that the
NPN might ride home of the coattails of an expected win in the presidential elections.
The 1983 elections secured a substantial win for President Shagari. The NPN candidates were
originally declared winners in 13 states, including two Yoruba states, Oyo and Ondo, and one Igbo state,
Anambra. It was essential to the aspirations of Yoruba and Igbo 1987 presidential hopefuls in the NPN that
in 1983 they should deliver at least one state in their region to the NPN. The Ondo result was reversed in by
the courts as, ultimately, was Ojukwu's election to the Senate in Nnewi, Anambra State. The election results
owed more to the decisions of the NPN and FEDECO than to the recorded preferences of voters. The
campaigns and results provoked political violence, which focused on state elections whose outcomes most
directly affect the majority of candidates for office and supplicants for resources. The NPN had used state
power to win the election against the fragmented opposition of powerful interests in the major regions of the
country arid several important states. Like the leaders of the NPN, the Kaduna mafia wanted to preserve
northern domination of the federation,
A post-election call for an 'Ethical Revolution' could only produce levity. The ruling party had
demonstrated its contempt for constitutional constraints and democratic conventions. The entire political class
had, from the outset, displayed an awesome venality. By the end of 1983 the regime was bankrupt and
discredited. Few Nigerians mourned the end of the regime when the military removed it from office on 31
December 1983. The military coup had been planned before the elections and was clearly designed to
address the concerns of senior officers and of their associates in the Kaduna 'mafia' for order and discipline.
The new military government sought to impose on Nigerian society the military virtues of order and
discipline. A series of decrees enabled the government to detain people arbitrarily, try people by military
tribunals and restricted the authority of the courts and the rights of journalists to criticise public officials.
Former politicians were jailed and a few sentenced to extremely long prison terms. The death penalty was
extended to cover a wide range of economic, violent and anti-social offences and public executions were
reintroduced. Executions of drug peddlers was only stopped when a senior police commander, related to the
head of state himself, was implicated in a drug scandal. Government declared a War on Indiscipline. It
assailed all forms of degeneracy and promoted the virtues of honesty, patriotism, hard work, family life and
queueing. It culminated in an attack of street traders in the name of environmental sanitation. The
government's policies of retrenchment brought them into conflict with journalists, academics, students,
lawyers and doctors.
The leading figures in the military junta which took power under Maj Gen Buhari were
predominantly northern in origin and conservative in outlook. They were drawn from the generation who had
been encouraged by northern ministers to join the army and make up the northern quota of recruits to the
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officer corps in the 1960s. They shared training, wartime experience in the federal cause and personal
friendships and had connections with their civilian counterparts in the Kaduna mafia. The cabinet had a
majority of civilians and was evenly recruited amongst from different regions. A leading Kaduna mafia
ideologue, Malimud Tukur was appointed to the key post of Minister of Commerce and Industries. The
regime's selective trials of former politicians and arrests of journalists concentrated on former opponents
(northern and southern) of the deposed NPN and seemed to allocate rewards disproportionately to the north.
The country's economic crisis was also to be address through military order and discipline. . Nigeria
would finance the servicing of its debts by retrenchments in government service, wage freezes, a strike ban,
the reintroduction of poll and cattle taxes and the raising of various "development levies'. The poor would
have to pay for the profligacy of the rich. While Buhari was preaching the need for austerity, the Chief of
Army Staff, Maj Gen Babangida proposed that Nigeria should develop its industrial economy by building an
'arms city' in the hinterland. Government maintained control of the overvalued exchange rate of the naira and
concentrated allocation of import licenses in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The state took on a
large share of responsibility for distributing imported food and consumer goods, mainly to state employees,
and promoted barter arrangements with Brazil and other countries. Wheat continued to be imported freely.
These measures discouraged exports and encouraged demands for imports without being able to meet them.
They concentrated the profits from imports and exports among a limited number of beneficiaries.
Government resisted IMF demands for a substantial (60 per cent) devaluation and an increase in the petrol
price.
In July 1985, Tunde Idiagbon, the chief of staff and driving force behind the regime's authoritarian
policies, declared that the regime had no plan to return Nigeria to civilian rule and banned political debate.
Buhari and Idiagbon were increasingly isolated from their military colleagues. Both the NPN government and
their military successors had exhausted their economic strategies and their political credibility. On 27 August
1985, Buhari and Idiagbon were overthrown.
Economic restructuring and political reform, 1984-1992
Maj-Gen Babangida headed the new Armed Forces Ruling Council. The AFRC and the Cabinet were
recruited from across the country. The government began on a liberal note, releasing prisoners, reducing
sentences and abolishing Decree 4 which constrained journalists from attacking public officials, though the
other repressive decrees of the Buhari government merely remained in abeyance. Government declared a
state of national economic emergency and banned the import of Rice and maize. Babangida then initiated a
debate on whether Nigeria should accept a loan from the IMF. Opposition came from trade unions, local
manufacturers and certain bankers and financiers who had been close to political power, support was muted;
it was strongest in the corporate sector, with the chairman of the United African Company (UAQ, Chief
Sonekan a noted supporter. Public opinion was strongly against it and the government discontinued its
negotiations with the IMF. No alternative strategy was in sight. By June 1986, the Lagos Chamber of
Commerce, the Nigerian Association of Manufacturers and key civil servants were call in favour of a
substantial devaluation.
Within a year of taking power, Babangida, like Murtala Mubammed, was challenged by an
attempted coup in which his own course mate, Maj Gen Vatsa, a notable poet, was involved. The coup
makers were marked by their training and academic qualifications and resented their exclusion from strategic
appointments. In January, Babangida appointed a Political Bureau, which he staffed mainly with academics,
to make recommendations for a political and economic programme which would lead to a transfer of power
to a civilian government on 1 October 1990. The stages of transition from military to civilian rule were not
to be as direct as they had been under the governments of Murtala and Obasanjo.
In early 1986, Babangida sought to win Muslim favour, and provoked Christian fears, by
announcing Nigeria's membership of the Organization of Islamic Conferences, which had not been approved
by the cabinet of the AFRC. Police went on the rampage and killed a number of students in Zaria,
demonstrating a continuity with previous governments and laying down a precedent for subsequent
depredations by the mobile police, the Tull-and goes'. In October, Dele Giwa, a leading investigative
journalist and critic of the Nigerian Security Organisation was blown up by a parcel bomb; the regime
blocked subsequent attempts to establish responsibility for the murder. The limits of military liberalism were
soon exposed.
In July 1986 Babangida outlined his own Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) which, in most
respects, followed the standard lines of IMF/ World Bank programmes. Dr Kalu, the Minister of Finance,
was himself a former IMF official. Nigeria gained access, in principle, to IMF and World Bank credit and
support for debt rescheduling, subject to continuing negotiations over their conditions. Commodity marketing
boards and import licences were abolished, tariffs were liberalised, fuel prices doubled and interest rates
increased. A foreign exchange auction was instituted in September. It produced a two-thirds fall in the
exchange rate of the naira. Access to the profits of the import-export economy switched from the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry to the banking system. A plethora of new banks was created to bid for foreign
exchange. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) managed the auction to distribute foreign exchange among
bidders and keep some control of the exchange rate. Against these trends to economic liberalisation, the
government added a ban on wheat imports to the existing bans of rice and maize. This was designed to
encourage wheat production but instead produced claims from different states to imaginary levels of wheat
output to sustain the federal government's subsidies for fertiliser. It lead to increased bread prices, illegal
imports of wheat flour and a collapse of the flour milling industry and strong criticisms from the US
government and grain exporters. In 1990 the government announced a forthcoming ban on the export of
cocoa beans, which it rescinded when it became clear that manufacturers lacked the capacity to process the
crop for export. The ban was supposed to reap for the Nigeria the questionable benefits of bencficiaiion; it
offered a means for government to recapture control of cocoa exports and the foreign exchange it earned.
Each round of devaluation opened further the gap between fuel prices in Nigeria and the price of oil in
world markets and of fuel in neighbouring countries. The World Bank continued to press the government to
raise fuel prices and end the wheat ban.
SAP initially seemed to be able to realise many of its objectives, though not always quite as they
had been planned. The cocoa price multiplied severalfold as a result of devaluation, the abolition of the
marketing board and demand for a crop which could be bought in naira and sold in dollars. Manufacturers
could get access to imported machinery and materials as long they were willing to pay higher prices for
imports and credit in a stagnant market. Northern manufacturers who had always looked to the state to
protect their interests were critical of the new import regime. Cotton production increased and the production
of textiles and other industries using local materials recovered. Production of vehicles and other industries
assembling imported parts fell. Government imposed a wage freeze on a divided trade union movement and
in 1988 dissolved the leadership of the NLC. Food prices remained relatively stable until drought recurred in
1987, provoking a ban of food exports which raised the cost of selling food across the border. However,
the government was unable to meet its declared commitment to end the fuel subsidy. Facing rising prices and
declining incomes, trade unions and the wider public refused to accept the cogent arguments for a fuel price
increases which, they presumed, would only go to line the pockets of those in government even deeper. The
exchange rate at the foreign exchange auction stayed between N4 and N5 to the dollar until 1988. An
expansion of the government's fiscal deficit and of bank credit fuelled inflation in 1988. By the end of the
year, the auction rate had fallen below NS to the dollar and the naira was only available on the autonomous
market at about N9. Bankers were able to recycle foreign exchange to pocket much of the difference. In
subsequent years, the appropriation of funds by the ruling soldiers and massive spending of money on
political campaigns would undermine the control of government spending and the money supply required for
the success of the structural adjustment programme and leading to a continuing erosion of the value of the
naira.
The military government's political programme combined a vision of directing the mobilisation of
popular energies to public purposes and managing the transition to a regulated system of electoral
competition. It rejected the Political Bureau's proposal for a state-directed and dirigiste 'socialist
socioeconomic system' and modified its political programme, generally to keep it line with the provisions of
the 1979 constitution. Two new states were created, resolving the problem posed in 1979 by the two-thirds
rule. A series of commissions were set up to deal with fiscal questions, codes of conduct and to conduct a
population census. The key innovation was the announcement that two, and only two, parties would be
recognised by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) after a political beauty contest in which contending
organisations would seek to establish their claims to meet the NECs criteria best. The political scientists who
proposed this solution argued that the combination of federalism and presidential government had created a
tendency towards the creation at the national level of a two-party system out of the multi-party system.
Politicians in the Second Republic had failed to recognise the logic of an American party system. The
military would therefore legislate it for them. In 1986, the military government had banned all politicians of
the Second Republic from politics for ten years. For the period of the transition, the ban was now extended
to all current and previous holders of high political and military office. The idea of building a new
democracy on a new generation relied on an extremely short memory: the 'newbreeds' of the Second
Republic had been even more corrupt than the 'old guard1 inherited from the First. The transition to civilian
rule was now postponed to 1 October 1992. Local elections were held in 1988 and the new constitution
promulgated in 1989.
As in 1977, the Constituent Assembly provided a fertile site for coalition making. Thirteen political
associations were registered, six of which were recommended by the NEC to the AFRC for the two
vacancies for official parties. The three leading contenders were the outcome of a reformation of the
alignments of the major parties in the Second Republic. Politicians bad not yet aligned themselves in
accordance with the bipolar logic of presidential government. On 7 Oct 1989, Babangida dissolved all
thirteen associations and created two parastatal parties. One the National Republican Convention, was to be a
'little to the right'; the other, the Social Democratic Party a little to the left'. Both would be effectively
parties of the centres, accepted the basic framework of federalism and presidenrialism and maintain the
economic restructuring programme initiated by the military. The new parties elected their executives in 1990:
the NRC chose Tom Dcimi, a southerner, as its party secretary, and the SDP Baba Kingibe, a northerner.
These decisions were interpreted as designed to secure a northern presidential candidate for the NRC and a
southern candidate for the SDP. The regime had reduced politics to its bare essentials. Parties would not be
concerned to develop their own policies and offer them to the electorate. They would, as in the United
States, simply provide the institutional framework within which candidates competed for office.
In a situation of economic and moral crisis, far more people responded to the promises of
evangelical preachers, Christian and Muslim, than to appeals by politicians who were largely left to play the
political game amongst themselves. In 1990, about four out of five registered voters ignored the elections by
'open ballot' to local government authorities. SDP gained a majority of councillors and councils. The rise of
religious enthusiasm lead to repeated outbreaks of religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the
northern states. They sometimes overlaid conflicts between communities over control of land and political
office. The regime itself was subject to religious rivalries and each new appointment was closely inspected
for its religious and sectional significance. In 1990 the leaders of a rather farcical attempted coup demanded
the temporary excision of five mainly Muslim states from Nigeria. The sudden, creation of a further nine
states provoked demonstrations over boundaries and the choice of capitals. Disputes over state and local
government bondaries provoked bloody conflicts over land between communities in several northern and
eastern states. Religious and communal conflicts lead to tens, hundreds, and even thousands of deaths.
Protests against oil pollution in the Delta and against rises in fuel prices and fares were met by brutal
suppression, provoking hostility towards and attacks on the police themselves.
The Gulf War presented Nigeria windfall oil revenues which disappeared from view in the national
accounts. Substantial sums were allocated from a separate presidential purse outside the normal budgetary
procedures. Lagos and its international airport became an important international centre for the export of
narcotics, which did not enter the national accounts. The budget deficits escalated out of control from 1991
onwards. External debts reached $34 billion in 1990 and debt servicing charges returned to the 34 per cent
figure of the Buhari period. The exchange rate fell from N5 to N9 to the dollar in 1990. The opening of
bureaux de change to encourage legal exchange of foreign currencies opened new ways for banks to recycle
their shares of the oil revenues allocated by the CBN. In 1992, the exchange rate was reduced to N18 to the
dollar and the naira floated. By the end of the year, it has reached N20 to the dollar, and prime interest
rates were well over 40 per cent.
In 1991 primary elections were held for state assemblies and governors. The parties proved unable
to manage them. The AFRC annulled results in nine states and selectively disqualified twelve candidates for
governor, alleging electoral irregularities and claiming the candidates were fronts for the interests of banned
politicians. . The SDP won majorities in 16 state assemblies, but only 14 state governorships., in Lagos,
disgruntled voters rejected the candidate whom, in their view, the military had imposed on them. The
military arrested several former ministers for being involved in the campaigns, and then lifted the ban on
former politicians taking part in politics. On 2 Jan 1992 state governors were sworn in, and the dates for the
presidential elections and the transfer of power postponed till the end of the year. The 1992 census results
were subject to partisan dispute; the total number of 88-5 million Nigerians gave the country its first
plausible population count since 1951.
The military governing was clearly losing its capacity to maintain public order and communal
violence, to pursue its economic strategies and to implement its political programme. Sceptics questioned
whether the military rulers, increasingly bloated with the fruits of office, intended to transfer power.
Soldiers, politicians and the presidency, 1992-1994
Babangida was the first military ruler of Nigeria to claim the title of President. He was determined to control
the succession to the office. The political class depended on the military to secure their access to office.
They consequently found themselves in the positions of clients to the regime. Babangida was able to change
the rules governing the election process time and again to suit his immediate priorities because the political
class preferred to stay in the game and adapt to the new conditions rather than to withdraw from the struggle
for office and its perquisites. They cared much for the chance of getting a share of the substance; procedures
only mattered in so far as they advanced or hindered their campaigns.
In July 1992, the SPD gained a majority in the elections to the two houses of the National
Assembly. However, the inauguration of the legislature had to await the presidential elections. The first
round of primaries took place on 1 August and were annulled. In September, primaries were held in different
states on three dates in September. Four leading candidates emerged from 23 contenders. For the SDP: Gen
(ret) Shehu Yar'adua, a scion of then Katsina ruling house, who had been an eminence grise behind one of
the aborted parties and candidates for party and legislative office and Chief Olu Falae, a Yoruba-speaker and
former Chief secretary to the Government. For the NRC: Alhaji Shinkafi and Adamu Ciroma, both
northerners who held high office under Shagari. It seemed quite likely that the final contest would be
between Yar'adua and Ciroma. two northerners who had been strongly linked in the past to the Kaduna
mafia. This was not to be. Chief Falae and a number of other contenders withdrew from the final round. The
AFRC annulled the primaries, dissolved the SDP and NRC party committees, and disqualified all 23
candidates thereby removing powerful figures whom Babangida could not risk as his successor. Fortunes
had been spent in the pursuit of office over the previous three years, but the electoral process remained
crucially incomplete.
The presidential election was now postponed to 12 June 1993 and the handover of power to 27
August 1993. A new administration, the Transitional Council, was introduced on 2 Jan 1993 under Chief
Sonekan but it was not responsible to the elected National Assembly but to the National Defence and
Security Council (NDSQ. Nigeria's western creditors and the international financial institutions welcomed
his appointment, but he proved unable to gain control of government spending or prevent the further decline
of the naira. The CBN maintained the auction rate at N24.99 to the dollar, which only caused the margin
between the official and parallel rates to widen significantly. The fuel price was way below the levels in
neighbouring countries, provoking massive smuggling and hoarding in anticipation of future increases.
The presidential race was thrown open to everyone and a new procedure of indirect election
introduced to decide on party nominations. This made the process easier to manage. Gen Gowon was
eliminated at the first round, by using his Christian religion as an issue among Muslim constituents and
Ojukwu was excluded for non-payment of tax. Two candidates emerged from this process, Chief Abiola
from Ogun State and Alhaji Tofa from Kano. Both had initially been associated with the NPN at the
beginning of the Second Republic and commanded large financial resources. Chief Abiola risked losing
Christian votes when he named a Muslim northerner, Baba Kingibe, as his vice-presidential candidate to
satisfy kingmakers in his own party. Tofa named Dr Ugoh, an Igbo-speaking economist who had been head
of the central bank in war-time Biafra. The advantages of appointing a Christian running mate were lost to
some extent when the press published past statements by Tofa of a pro-Islamic and apparently anti-Christian
nature. On the eve of the election, the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN), lead by a wartime arms
profiteer, political entrepreneur and bankrupt, Chief Nzeribe, presumed to be acting for interests close to the
military, brought a court action to stop the election. It went ahead nevertheless and early results indicated a
clear win for Chief Abiola. The ABN then obtained an injunction to prevent the release of further results,
opening the way for the regime to abrogate the elections.
The unofficial results showed that Abiola had won a majority in 19 states - all seven in the original
Western Region, three out of seven in the former East, and nine of sixteen in the erstwhile North. Both
candidates won at least thirty per cent of the vote in all states except Sokoto and Kebbi, in the north-west,
and the six majority Yoniba-speaking states. In many respects, the compulsory two party system with its
military-approved candidates had defied its critics, who had predicted a sharp polarisation between north and
south, Christian and Muslim. However, it had produced the wrong candidate assuming, that is. that any
civilian successor would have been acceptable to the ruling military clique. The cancellation of the election
provoked a series of demonstrations and strikes. These were largely confined to the cities of the south-west
and to the petroleum workers. In the south-west, the result was widely, though not necessarily correctly,
interpreted as the outcome of a refusal by northern interests to accept a southern, and more specifically, a
Yoruba president. This response alienated some northern supporters of the SDP from Abiola and their fellow
party members. Some of the excluded presidential candidates now saw a chance to revive their own
ambitions. However, Babangida failed to persuade a majority of parliamentarians, to support him against
Abiola. The US government suspended all assistance to Nigeria and the British government reviewed its
military cooperation. Politicians of all party adjusted their sights to the new rules of the political game.
Babangida himself had played his last card and the game would now continue without him.
Babangida met the commitment to transfer power to a civilian government by resigning on 26
August in favour of an interim national government headed by Chief Sonekan, which was dearly under the
direction of Gen Abacha who took the post of Secretary for Defence and replaced Babangida's appointees
with his own men in key military positions. They were confronted by a strike called by the NLC against the
rejection of the election results and a proposal to raise fuel prices from 70k (c. J0.03) a litre to N7.50. The
new government agreed to postpone the fuel price rise; only the oil workers union (Nupeng) held out for a
few days for recognition of the election. On November, the Sonekan government again announced an
increase in the fuel price, this time to NS per litre, provoking another national strike. On 10 Nov a Lagos
court declared that the installation of the interim government, which followed Babangida's installation was
illegal. Abacha took direct control of power on 17 November to the satisfaction, and even with the
connivance, of at least some of the opponents of the interim government. He reduced he increase in the fuel
price to settle the NLC strike which had provided a good opportunity for him to remove Chief Sonekan. He
dismissed all elected officials, assemblies and party committees, retired leading officers associated with the
Babangida regime and even with his own take over of power, and took a leaf out of the democratic
opposition's book by promises a constitutional conference. He formed a new Federal Executive Council
under the authority of the military Provincial Ruling Council (PRC). Abacha himself headed the new cabinet,
with Lt Gen Diya, a Yoruba officer, as his deputy and Dr Kalu as Finance Minister. He recruited politicians
from all parties, including Abiola's Vice-presidential nominee, Baba Kingibe, the former President of the
Senate, Iyorchia Ayu, sometime presidential candidates, Adamu Ciroma and Jerry Gana, former governors,
Samuel Ogbemudia (military, Mid-West), Lateef Jakande (UPN, Lagos), Solomon Lar (NPP, Plateau) and
Abubakar Rimi (PRP, Kano) and two leading campaigners for democracy and human rights, Dr Onagoruwa
and Ebenezer Babatope. Few politicians resisted his call. Yar'adua and Shinkafi both elected to stay, out of
the cabinet and nurse their ambitions.
By the end of 1993, the government's economic strategy had fallen apart, alongside the collapse of
its political programme. The budget deficit had reached N75 million. Inflation was estimated at 100 per cent.
Western diplomats and the World Bank had leaked reports revealing the massive leakage of state funds.
Senior officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Customs Service and the National Drug
Law Enforcement Agency were variously investigated, suspended and arrested. A list of leading military and
political figures, including the leader of the NLC, were identified as beneficiaries of an allocation of land in
Lagos by the federal government. The new government tried to turn the clock back to the policies of the era
prior to the structural adjustment programme while denying that they were abandoning it. The exchange rate
was fixed at N22 to the dollar. All foreign currency acquired by banks was to be returned to the central
bank, which decides on the allocation of foreign exchange. Legal interest rates were capped at 21 per cent,
way below the rate of inflation. The black market exchange rate rose to N45 to the dollar. Annual debt
servicing was restricted to 30 per cent of export revenues. Professor Aluko even suggested that commodity
marketing boards be re-established to enable the government to recover the foreign exchange earned by
agricultural exports. The World Bank and the IMF made it clear that they did not think the return to these
old policies could work. They would clearly not accept them. On 4 April 1994 the US Department of State
listed the Nigerian government as failing to take adequate steps to prevent drug trafficking. Nigerian drug
enforcement officials were identified as beneficiaries of the lucrative re-export of narcotics.
Abacha and Diya succeeded in dividing Abiola's supporters in the SDP and the democratic
movement outside the party. By returning to a constitutional conference, the military began anew the
timetable for a transition to civilian government, granting themselves an extended lease of life. They have
committed themselves to allowing a return to party politics in 1995, but not to a date for the handover to
their successors. Brig Gen David Mark, recently retired alleged that their aim was to stay in power until
1999. Like Babangida, the military rulers now held the political initiative and could determine the timing and
procedures for the transition to civilian rule. They have coopted some of their opponents; others have hedged
their bets, publicly supporting Abiola's claim to the presidency, but keeping an eye on, or even participating
in, the elections to and the developments at the national constitutional conference.
The democratic movement outside the parties divided over issues of internal democracy and
responses to overtures from the new regime. When Abiola publicly endorsed a resolution of the US House of
Representatives seeking to strengthen sanctions against the Nigerian government, Kingibe responded by
claiming that he and Abiola had canvassed military intervention against the interim national government. The
formation of the Abacha government and the call for a national constitutional conference found the various
regional and political networks ill prepared to respond. Some groups sought to build new regional blocs in
preparation for a possible redivision of the national patrimony. More cautious voices warned of the need to
maintain national unity. Northern interests initially resisted the call for a national conference, at least until
they could agree on their own political strategy. Leading political figures took part in the elections to
establish their political base and prevent local rivals from upstaging them. Yar'adua, Ojukwu, and Lamidi
Adedibu, a leading Ibadan politician, all put themselves forward for election. When delegates were elected
to the conference, tum-out was low, particularly in the south-west. The National Democratic Coalition
brought together a number of politicians and military officers who had been excluded by, or excluded
themselves from, the Babangida and Abacha regimes. They included the former presidential candidate, Chief
IS
False, Babangida's former deputy, Commodore Ukiwe, former military and civilian governors from three
regimes (Gen Adebayo, West; Bola Ige, Oyo, Segun Osoba, Ogun), Chief Enahoro, a leading figure in the
AG and later the NPN, and Beko Ransome-Kuti, chair of die Campaign for Democracy. . They demanded a
'Sovereign National Conference', not a constitutional conference, partly made up of government nominees,
who would have to submit their recommendations to the military government. They demanded that Chief
Abiola should be called upon 'to form a broad-based National Government, composed of representatives of
various ethnic and interest groups in the country.' The regime has found ways of persuading some signatories
to withdraw their support from the NADECO declaration.
On 11 June 1994 Abiola announced the formation of a new government at a secret venue. Abacha
declared on 12 June that 'no individual and no group will be able to bold this country to ransom.' The regime
arrested Abiola and held him incommunicado. They are reported to be planning to try him for treason.
Nupeng declared another strike in support of the election. Abiola and his supporters can no longer claim the
broad national support which voted for him as president in 1993. Some have gone over to the regime and
others, including Abiola himself, have been compromised by their failure to maintain a consistent demand
for acceptance of the 1993 election results. Above all, the military control the instruments of power and
patronage. The military regime is bankrupt and lacks a strategy for dealing with the economic crisis or the
country's debt obligations. Morale in the army is low and conditions are poor for all but a privileged few. It
is difficult to see how a new electoral procedure could claim legitimacy when the winner of the previous
election was not allowed to take office A trial for treason might raise the issue of the regime's legitimacy.
As the national conference continues its deliberations, the regime and the political class appears to have
reached a constitutional impasse.
Politics, class and administration
The political history of Nigeria reveals a number of recursive themes. Access to state funds and state office
was a potent instrument of class formation. The colonial marketing boards provided the state with a
mechanism for taxing exports and the politicians with the means to pay for their policies, their political
campaigns and their business activities. In the 1950s, power was devolved to regional governments. This
gave shape to political alignments and fiscal arrangements. The regional marketing boards provided the
financial basis for the regional governments and their ruling parties. After independence, and particularly
during and after the civil war, power and patronage increasingly came to exercised by the federal
government, which extended its capacity to regulate imports, exports and the exchange of currencies. In the
1970s mineral oil exports replaced agricultural exports as the major source of foreign exchange and state
revenue, consolidating federal domination of the import-export economy and the profits and revenues
extracted from it. Political competition within and between states turned on their capacity to claim a share of
mineral oil revenues and to distribute them. The creation of new states meant that political coalitions had to
be built on coalitions of state based interests. Regional networks persisted, but they could no longer rely on
regional governments to secure their political support. Politicians from each of the three dominant language
groups, and from the former regional 'minorities' were divided by rivalries for local and state office and
national positions, and differences of strategies through which to advance their own careers and the interests
of their groups.
A series of colonial and military regimes sponsored transitions to elected government. They began
with constitutional conferences, indirectly elected from local government constituencies. The colonial/
military regime determined the shape of the constitution and secured the agreement of the political class to
their proposals. Politicians invoked constitutional principles in order to serve their own political strategies.
They showed little respect for laws or conventions and exploited all the resources at their disposal,
constitutional and extra-constitutional to gain access to and maintain their hold on power. Political elites
reached compromises from time to time. These were not the outcome of an attempt to identify shared goals
and establish agreed principles, but rather the result of recognising the current balance of forces.
The 1979 constitution, and its successor, recognised that politics, in Nigeria was concerned with the
allocation of scarce resources, not to alternative ends but to different people. They mobilised resources in
order to be elected to political office, and treated political office as a source of bounty which would repay
their investments, rewards their clients and fund their continuing political campaigns. The refusal of the
politicians in power to subject themselves to the test of competitive elections lead to the collapse of the "First
Republic'. The 1983 elections in the different states were determined by the ability of the ruling NPN to
impose its claims to some states, and its willingness to concede others to its opponents. The choice of
governors was the outcome of the rivalries among regional blocs within the NPN, concerned to position
themselves for the following elections in 1987. Their manipulations destroyed such political credit as the
civilian government could claim and left the path open for a further military intervention.
Successive military governments have sought to solve Nigeria's problems by unifying administration
under military auspices and bringing order and discipline to society and politics. The parade ground approach
proved ineffective in adderssing economic crises, political conflict or social order. Military rulers relied on
civil servants and aligned with and coopted politicians to serve their regimes. They soon acquired a taste for
the benefits of office, which provided the means for establishing themselves in commerce, industry, finance
and gentleman farming and of launching their own political careers. The turnover of military and civilian
administrations as a result of coups and transfers of power created scope for promotions within both the
armed services and the civil service, and sustained high expectations of social mobility and access to the
rewards of high office. The political class, replenished from time to time by new recruits from business and
universities, as well as the military and the civil service, resented the control of power by military officers
whom they regarded as less competent and less entitled to rule than themselves. Hence their consistent
support for a return to civilian nile. In the meantime they sought to position themselves most effectively for
the contest for political office and depended on the military to make it possible for them to return to power.
: Military governments need to offer the prospect of a return to civilian rule and find themselves outsted, by
other soldiers, when they renounce their intention to leave office. By cdopting politicians into the political
process, they are able to extend their period of office and control their succession. Trade unions have resisted
government economic policies and repressive practices. National strikes have provided a means of pursuing
workers demands and have sometimes acted as a focus for popular opposition to a repressive and
, exploitative regime. Governments have acceeded to their immediate economic demands without making
j concessions to their political objectives.
Three aspects of politics may be distinguished: politics as the allocation of scarce resources, politics
as the pursuit of public policy, and politics as the process of class conflict. In Nigeria, the competition for
scarce resources has displaced class politics: popular demands force their way on to the political stage in the
forms of workers strikes and local rural rebellions but are rarely incorporated into the competition of parties.
Considerations of public policy give way time again to calculations of political and economic advantage.
Democratic poliical competition can only operate within an accepted framework of rules and conventions.
The unconstrained pursuit of power, by military rulers and their civilian rivals, continues to stand in the way
of the establishment of a democratic political order.
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NIGERIA 1914-93
1914 Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria.
1939 Southern Provinces divided into Eastern and Western Regions.
1939 Government takes over purchase and export of cocoa.
1944 Formation of NCNC (National Conv of Nigeria & the Cameroons).
1946-7 Formation of commodity marketing boards for export crops.
1950 Macpherson Constitution. Provision for regional elections.
1950 Formation of AG (Action Group) in West; NEPU in North.
1951 Formation of Northern People's Congress (NPC) in North.
1951 Elections. Governments formed by NPC (NR) AG (WR) NCNC (ER).
1953 Constitutional crisis - attacks on Igbo and on NEPU in Kano.
1953-4 Constitutional conferences. Regionalisation of marketing boards, allocation of revenues.
1954 Major parties leaders are regional premiers: Ahmadu Bello (NPC), Awolowo (AG), Azikiwe (NCNC).
1954 Federal elections NPC majority in NR, NCNC in WR and ER. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC) PM of NPC-
NCNC federal government.
1955 Northern minorities form UMBC.
1956 Regional elections won by NPC (NR) AG (WR) NCNC (ER).
1957 UMBC and (eastern) UNEP affiliate to AG.
1959 Federal elections NPC 148; NCNC 89; AG 75; NPC-NCNC govt
1960 Awolowo becomes Federal Opposition Leader, Akintola WR PM.
1960 AG call and win election in WR.
1960 1 Oct Independence. Tiv rebellion in NR.
1961 NPC and NCNC win elections in NR, ER.
1962 AG crisis (Awolowo v. Akintola) Federal govt declares State of Emergency and dissolves WR govt
1962-63 Censuses, inflating populations of all regions.
1963 Treason Trial against Awolowo and others. Akintola PM of UPP (AG defectors)yNCNC govt in WR.
1964 Akintola forms new NNDP government in WR.
1964 Mid-West Region created, Osadebay leads NCNC govt
1964 General strike.
1964 Formation of NNA (NPC, NNDP & ors);UPGA (NCNC, AG, NEPU).
1964 December Elections. UPGA calls boycott. Constitutional crisis.
1965 March Little Elections. NPC-NCNC-NNDP federal government (AG out).
1965 Tiv rebellion in NR. WR elections. NNDP win by fraud. Yoruba rebellion and political violence in WR.
' 1966 Jan 15 Military coup by majors fails. Ironsi head of Military Govt (FMG).
1966 July 29 Counter-coup. Gowon head of FMG.
1967 Creation of 12 states. Secession of ER CBiafra1).
1970 Defeat of Biafra.
1975 July 29 Military coup. Murtala Mohammed head of FMG.
1976 Mohammed assassinated. Obasanjo head of FMG.
1977 New "Presidential' constitution. States increased to 19.
1978 New political parties NPN, UPN, PRP, NPP, GNPP.
1979 Federal and regional elections. Shagari (NPN) President.
1983 Elections; Shagari elected. NPN claim 13 states. Political violence.
1983 Dec 31 Military coup. Buhari head of FMG.
1985 Aug 27 Military coup. Babangida head of FMG.
1986 SAP (structural adjustment programme).
1987 States increased to 21.
1991 States increased to 30.
1991-2 Elections, with only two parties: National Republican Convention (NRC), Social Democratic Party (SDF).
1993 June 12 Presidential election. Abiola, SDP. gains majority of votes. Election
1993 Aug 26 President Babangida replaced by Chief Sonekan
1993 Nov 18 General Abacha overthrows Chief Sonekan.
THE CIVIL WAR 1966-1970
1966
Jan 15 Military coup by 7 majors. PMs of Federation, NR, WR, senior officers killed. Coup fails. Maj-Gen Ironsi
takes command. May 24 Decree 34 abolishes regions, unifies civil service.
May 28 Demos against Decree 34 in North, followed by attacks on Igbos in northern commercial centres. C. 600
killed.
July 28-9 Counter-coup by northern junior officers, NCOs. Ironsi and Fajuyi (Mil Gov WR) and eastern officers
killed. Coup fails in ER. Northern troops demand secession and accept Lt-Col Gowon as commander. Lt-
Col Ojukwu (Mil Gov ER) rejects Gowon.
Sep 12 Constitutional conference. ER, NR favour 'confederal'; WR, MWR, FMG favour federal constitution, with
new states.
Sep 16 Soldiers in attacks on Igbos in northern towns.
Sep 20 NR switches to federal constitution, with new states.
Sep 28 False Radio Kaduna report of killings of northerners in ER leads to massacres of easterners in North.
C. 10,000 easterners killed in north; 1,000,000 + return to ER.
Oct 3 Constitutional Conference adjourned.
Nov 16 Fed government proposes new states, constituent assembly
1967
Jan 4-5 Supreme Military Council, inc Ojukwu, meet at Aburi. Agree to 'concurrence' of military governors to
SMC decisions.
Jan 20 Federal civil servants object to Aburi proposals.
Feb 25 Ojukwu demands implementation of Aburi in full by 31 Mar.
Mar 31 ER appropriates all federal revenues in ER.
May 4 Awolowo and National Conciliation Committee visit Enugu.
May 27. Gowon creates 12 states in place of regions.
May 30 Ojukwu declares secession of'Republic of Biafra'.
Jun 12 Gowon appoints Awolowo and other civilians to Fed Ex Co.
July 6 Nig 1 Div attack from north.
July 25 Nig 3 Div land at Bonny from sea.
Aug 9 'Liberation Army from Biafra'invades Mid West under Banjo.
Aug 23 Nigerians hold Biafran advance at Ore, WR. Banjo retreats.
Sep 24 Banjo and others executed for treason against Ojukwu.
Oct 1 Nig 1 Div captures Enugu, Biafran capital.
Oct 9 Nig 2 Div captures Asaba, completes liberation of Mid West.
Oct 12 Nig 2 Div fails to cross Niger at Onitsha.
Oct 18 Nig 3 Div captures Calabar from sea.
1968
Mar 21 Nig 2 Div captures Onitsha from north.
Apr 13-20 May Tanzania,Gabon,Ivory Coast,Zambia recognize Biafra. May 23-31 Kampala peace talks. Nigeria
demands end to secession and twelve states; Biafra cease-fire and pre-war boundaries.
Aug 5 Addis Ababa peace talks. Demands as at Kampala.
Sep 3,16 Nig 3 Div captures Aba, Owerri.
Sep 9 De Gaulle admits limited French aid for Biafra.
1969
Apr 22-25 Nig 1 Div captures Umuahia, Nig 3 Div loses Owerri.
Dec 21-23 Biafran commandos disarm Biafran 12 Div on Aba-Umuahia road as saboteurs. Nig 3 Div advances
from Aba to Umuahia.
1970
Jan 11 Ojukwu flies to Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
Jan 12 Effiong announces Biafran surrender.
NIGERIA UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENTS 1984-1994.
1983 31 Dec Military coup. Maj-Gen Buhari, head of Supreme Military Council (SMC),
Maj-Gen Idiagbon, Chief of Staff (SMHQ), Maj-Gen Babangida, Chief of Army Staff.
1984 Arrests, detention and selective trials of ex-governors, ministers.
1984 Feb Repressive Decrees 23,4, allowing trial by military tribunal, arbitrary arrest, restricting courts,
journalists.
1984 Sept Retrenchments. Hospitals strike.
1984 Government declares War Against Indiscipline (WAI).
1985 July Idiagbon declares no schedule for return to civilian rule, bans debate on political future.
1985 27 Aug Military coup. Maj Gen Babangida assumes the title of President as head of state and Armed
Forces Ruling Council. Cdre Ukiwe Deputy, Domkat Bali, Chief - Jt Chiefs of Staff, Maj-Gen. Abacha
Chief of Army Staff.
198S Aug 31 87 politicians and others released from detention.
1985 Oct 1 State of national economic emergency. Ban on imports of rice and maize. Government sets up
Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure. Import licenses phased out.
1985 Dec 12 Debate over IMF loan. Negotiations with IMF suspended.
1985 Dec 20 Attempted coup, led by Maj-Gen Vatsa.
1985 Dec Number of banks: 40.
1986 Jan Civilian government on 1 October 1990. Political Bureau appointed.
1986 Feb Thirteen involved in coup executed.
1986 Feb Babangida announces that Nigeria accepted as member of Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIQ.
1986 May 23 Police on rampage at Ahmadu Bello Univ., Zaria. Some 20 killed.
1986 May Ban on imports of wheat (and other food) from Jan 1987 announced.
1986 June 27 All Second Republic politicians banned bom politics for 10 years after political parties allowed.
1986 July ex-Pres Shagari and ex-VP Ekwueme released from detention.
1986 July Structural adjustment program (SAP), inc. abolition of import licences; commodity marketing boards
cease trading. Fueld prices raised from 15 to 29.5 k/ litre.
1986 Sept 26 Two-tier Foreign Exchange Market. (Second, SFEM, by Central Bank, CBN, auction). Naira falls
from N1.55 to N4.6 = $1. CBN rations foreign exchange and bids.
1986 Oct World Bank loan of $452m. agreed.
1986 Oct 6 Cdre Ukiwe replaced as deputy to Babangida by Vice-Adm Aikhomu.
1986 Oct 19 Dele Giwa, editor of Newswatch, killed by a parcel bomb (presumed to be by security forces).
1986 Dec Agreement on rescheduling of debts.
1986 Dec 11 Exchange rate N3.2 = $1.
1987 Jan IMF stand-by agreement approves SDR 650 m.
1987 Mar Christian-Muslim clashes in Kafanchan, Kaduna State. Some 30 dead. Clashes in Kaduna, Zaria,
Katsina.
1987 July 7 Government sets up Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice, Self-Reliance and Economic Recovery
(MAMSER).
1987 July 11 White Paper on (Cookey) Report of Political Bureau. Recommendation for socialist economy
rejected. AFRC announces civilian government on 1 October 1992.
1987 July First tier abolished. Foreign exchange market (FEM) by auction. N3.95 = $1.
1987 Sept All previous holders of high political and military office banned from politics through transition.
1987 Sept States increased to 21 (Katsina, Akwa Ibom).
1987 Nov Exchange rate c. N4.5 = $1.
1987 Dec 12 Local government elections, without parties (annulled in 312 wards).
1988 Jan IBRD loans for S2.95 b. proposed, subject to agreement on economic measures.
1988 Feb Divided Nigerian Labour Congress leadership dissolved. NLC under administrator.
1988 Mar 26 Local elections rerun in 312 wards.
1988 Mar Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission, National Population Commission, Code of Conduct
Bureau and Tribunal set up.
1988 Apr Ministers replace Permanent Secretaries as 'Chief Executive and Accounting Officer".
1988 Apr LG councillors elect 450 members to constituent assembly; AFRC nominates 117.
1988 May Strike, student demonstrations against rise in fuel price from 39.5 to 42k/ litre. Six killed in Jos.
1988 May 11 Constituent Assembly inaugurated.
1988 July Academic Staff Union of Universities proscribed; leaders imprisoned.
1988 Nov Babangida bans further discussion of Shari'a courts by CA.
1988 Nov Demonstrations against turbanning of Ibrahim Oasuki as Sultan of Sokoto, imposed by military
government. Ten die.
1988 Dec Exchange rate N5.3=$l;second rate (autonomous market N9=$l).
1989 Jan. Interbank Foreign Exchange Market instituted. Government relaxes constraints on foreign holdings in
Nigerian firms. IMF, IBRD (World Bank) approve recovery programme, necessary for loan
disbursement, further IMF stand-by and debt rescheduling.
1989 May Constitution promulgated Civilian government still I October 1992. Elections to be between two
parties, selected by AFRC from register compiled by NEC.
1989 Oct 5 NEC recommends six of 13 registered associations to AFRO PSP, NNC, PFN, LC, NLP, RPN.
1989 Oct 7 Babangida dissolves all 13 associations. Creates two parastatal parties:
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRQ.
1989 Dec NEC publishes draft constitutions and manifestos of SDP, NRG
1989 Dec Babangida takes over Ministry of Defence; Abacha, Joint Chiefs of Staff. .
1989 Average exchange rate: N7.32 = $1. Fuel price 60k/ litre.
1990 Jan Government announces ban on cocoa exports from Jan 1991.
1990 April 22 Attempted coup, led by Maj Orkar. Demands excision of five mainly Muslim states from Nigeria.
1990 July Forty two involved in coup executed (27 more in Sept).
1990, July Lagos State govt bulldozes slum settlement at Maroko, Lagos.
1990 July 7 SDP and NRC state party executives elected by more than 44,000 officials.
1990 Aug NRC elects Chief Ikirni (Edo), SDP Kingibe (Bornu) as party secretary.
1990 Aug Government reshuffle. Post of Chief of General Staff abolished. Abacha, Minister of Defence, only
serving officer in Council of Ministers.
1990 Aug-Sept Crisis of commercial bank liquidity. CBN reports government spending far above budget
estimates.
1990 Oct Police suppress Ogoni demonstrating for compensation from Shell. 80 killed.
1990 Oct Ban on cocoa exports rescinded.
1990 Nov Legislation introduces 'open ballot'.
1990 Dec Local government elections. Turnout c. 20%. Councillors SPD 2,934 NRC 2,588. Council chairmen
SPD 232, NRC 208.
1990 Dec Exchange rate N8.47=$l.
1990 ? Revenue allocation formula allocates shares among states: population 40%, primary enrolment 11.25%,
inverse enrolment 3.75%, equal shares 40%.
1991 Jan CBN to fix rate (for govt sales from oil revenues). Bureaux de change opened.
1991 Jan 9 Agreement with IMF to facilitate rescheduling of debt.
1991 April Muslim-Christian conflicts in Bauchi. Some 250 dead.
1991 June NRC and SDP select 144,950 delegates for primary elections. Some 45 presidential candidates
emerge.
1991 Aug 27 States increased to 30. Demonstrations over boundaries and capitals.
1991 Oct Muslim-Christian conflicts in Kano. More than 300 dead.
1991 pet Primary elections for state governors and assemblies.
1991 Nov Primary results annulled in 9 states. 12 candidates for governor disqualified.
1991 Dec 12 Capital transferred from Lagos to Abuja.
1991 Dec 14 State assembly elections: SDP win 16, NRC 14. State governor elections: NRC win 16; SDP 14.
Former ministers arrested for involvement in elections.
1991 Dec 19 Ban on involvement of former politicians lifted.
1991 Dec Number of banks 120.
1991 Federation account: Federal 50%, states 30%, local government 15%, ecological fund 5% (of which 1.5%
oil producing communities); states shares: population 30%, land mass 10%, internal revenue 10%,
equal 50%. .
1991-2 Conflicts over land in new Taraba State lead to perhaps 5,000 deaths.
1992 Jan 2 State governors swom in. Presidential elections due 5 December. Civilian government due 2 Jan
1993.
1992 Feb Christian-Muslim conflict in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna State. Some 30 people killed.
1992 Feb State governors empowered to appoint commissioners without assembly approval.
1992 Mar 6 CBN reduces exchange rate from N10.6 to N17,8=$l, prior to floating naira.
1992 Unpublished World Bank Report critidack of transparency and accountability...' and inability to account for
1990 windfall oil revenues.
1992 Mar 19 Announcement of census: 88.5 m Nigerians. Disputed by southerners.
1992 May 'Floated' exchange rate stays fixed at N18.6=$l.
1992 May Demonstrations against fares and fuel price rises violently suppressed. 21 killed; 120 detained,
including Beko Ransome-Kuti, chair of Campaign for Democracy (CD).
1992 16 May Renewed Christian-Muslim violence in Zangon-Kataf. Some 1,000 killed.
1992 June Federation account: federal 48.5%, states 24 %, local 20 %, ecological fund 15%.
1992 July 4 National Assembly elections. Senate SDP 52, NRC 39, House SDP 314, NRC 275.
7992 Aug 1 Primary elections for presidential candidates. Elections annulled due to malpractices.
1992 Sept 12, 19, 26 Primary elections [or presidential candidates among 23 aspirants. Leading candidates Gen
(ret) Yar'Adua, Chief Falae (SDP), Alhaji Shinkafi, Malam Ciroma (NRC). Falae and others boycott
final round.
1992 Oct AFRC annuls primaries, dissolves SDP and NRC committees.
1992 Nov Presidential election postponed to 12 June 1993. Civilian government to 27 August 1993. Disqualifies
23 candidates in primaries.
1992 Dec 5 National Assembly convened in Abuja as scheduled.
1992 Dec Foreign exchange rate N20.5=$l. Prime and max interest rates 44.4 and 48.1 per cent.
1993 Jan 2 Transitional council, headed by Chief Sonekan inaugurated, responsible not to National Assembly
but to National Defence and Security Council (NDSC).
1993 Jan Some 300 presidential candidates emerge.
1993 Feb National public sector strike. Wage increases conceded.
1993 Feb Indirect elections of candidates at ward and local government level.
1993 Feb 18 Foreign exchange auction N24.99=$l, parallel rate N27.60=$l.
1993 Mar Foreign exchange fixed at N24.99=$l; parallel rate N35=$l.
1993 Mar 24 Creditors warn Nigeria to reduce arrears on official debts.
1993 Mar 29 Presidential candidates nominated: NRC Alhaji Tofa; SDP Chief Abiola, both Muslims.
1993 Apr Vice-presidential candidates: NRC Dr Ugoh; SDP Kingibe.
1993 Apr Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN) calls for four more years of military rule.
1993 May Failure to agree with IMF over exchange rate policy and domestic fuel prices.
1993 June 10 Abuja High Court grants ABN (head Chief Nzeribe) an injunction to stop election.
1993 June 12 NEC goes ahead with election.
1993 June 14 NEC announces results in 14 States. Abiola wins in 11, with 4.3m to 2.3m votes.
1993 June 16 ABN secures injunction to prevent further release of results. CD later promulgates results in 30
states. Abiola wins in 19, plus Abuja, with 8.2 m. to 6.0 m, votes.
1993 June 23 NDSC declares elections invalid. Suspends NEC and transition to civilian government.
1993 June 25 Babangida pledges new election, with new candidates, before 27 August.
1993 July Babangida seeks support for interim government. NRC and 'northern elders' agree; SDP is divided and
mainly against. .
1993 July Demonstrations and looting in Lagos suppressed by army. Over 100 killed. Publishers proscribed.
Democrats arrested.
1993 July 31 Babangida nominates Sonekan to succeed him as head of an interim national government.
1993 Aug Abiola flees to London.
1993 Aug 9 Attack on Ogoni village. 35 killed.
1993 Aug 12-14 Strikes and civil disobedience in Lagos and south-west.
1993 Aug Government announces increase in fuel prices (from 70k - N7.50/ litre), leading to run on fuel.
1993 Aug 24 Report of 'Budget Monitoring Committee' reveals attacks massive leakage of state funds and
payments to 'special projects account'. Revealed to press by Western diplomats on 21 Nov.
1993 Aug 26 Babangida resigns.
1993 Aug 27 Interim national government installed, headed by Chief Sonekan. Abacha is Secretary for Defence.
1993 Aug 29 Strike, called by National Labour Congress, for recognition of election and against fuel price rises.
1993 Aug 31 Decrees 58-61 authorises transition period, give powers to Chief Sonekan as C-in-C and to
National Assembly to make laws.
1993 Sep 3 NLC succeeds in getting fuel price rises postponed. Nupeng (oil workers) stay out till Sept 6.
1993 Sept 8 Sonekan meets state governors. Governors of Ondo, Ogun, Osun and Oyo refuse to attend. SPO
governors reject another presidential election.
1993 Sept 10 Date for new presidential election, 19 Feb 1994.
1993 Sept 13 Northern Consultative Group (NRC and SDP politicians) meet in Kaduna. Accept interim
government as 'best in the circumstances'.
1993 Sept 13 Abacha reverses Babangida's military appointments. U-Gen Diya chief of defence staff.
1993 Sept 24 Abiola returns to Lagos.
1993 Oct Arrests and suspensions of officials of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPQ
1993 Nov 2 Ebute, a supporter of interim government, replaces Ayu as President of the Senate.
1993 Nov 8 Government announces sevenfold increase in fuel prices (70k - N5; c S 0.03 - 0.22).
1993 Nov 10 Lagos court rules that interim government is illegal. Leading military and political figures (and
even the head of the NLC) named as beneficiaries of federal government Lagos land allocation.
Demonstrations against interim government and fuel price rise, looting and arson.
1993 Nov 15 Trade unions launch a general strike against sevenfold increase in fuel prices.
1993 Nov 17 Military (palace) coup; Abacha assumes power.
1993 Nov 18 Abacha announces Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), dissolves national, state and local
governments, assemblies and councils, SDP and NRC, NEC, proscribes any political associations,
promises constitutional conference. Demonstrations against military government, fuel price rises.
1993 Nov 21 Fuel price rise reduced to fourfold. 67 (Ex-) Senators denounce take-over.
1993 Nov 26 Retirement of leading officers associated with Babangida regime (and Abacha coup). New Federal
Executive Council, under PRC, headed by AbachaJJiya as Deputy. KI Kalu is Finance Minister (to
satisfy IMF/WB). New Cabinet includes politicians from all parties, including Kingibe(Foreign
Minister), Adamu Ciroma, Ayu, Jakande (ex-UPN gov of Lagos), Rimi (ex-PRP gov of Kano), and
some democracy campaigners (Onagoruwa, Babatope). Two former northern presidential candidates,
Yar'adua and Shinkafi stay out.
1993 Dec Inflation estimated at 100%.
1994 Jan 14 Commission for Constitutional Conference appointed.
1994 Jan 28 Exchange rate fixed at N22=$l; no open foreign exchange market. CBN to allocate foreign
exchange. Interest rate reduced to 21 %. (Black market exchange rate c. N45=$l).
1994 Feb 5 Campaign for Democracy, 2nd National Convention. Divisions over alleged relations to military.
1994 Feb Nigerian Customs Services. The Comptroller-general, his deputies and assistants on compulsory leave.
1994 Mar 10 Abiola supports US House resolution 151 seeking strengthened sanctions.
1994 Mar 21 Kingibe replies, stating Abiola and he were among those actively canvassing military intervention.
1994 Apr 4 Nigeria listed by US State Dept as a major drug trafficking country.
1994 May Timetable for National Constitutional Conference. 273 elected, 96 nominated delegates. PRC to
release new constitution 31 Dec 1993. Politics with new parties to resume 17 January 1995.
1994 May 15 National Democratic Coalition calls for boycott of const conference. Demands hand over to Abiola.
1994 May 21 Election of ward delegates to districts for National Constitutional Conference.
1994 May 28 Election of National Constitutional Conference delegates from senatorial districts. Low turn-out.
1994 May 30 54 Senators declare Abacha government illegitimate. Senators Ebute and Nwite charged with
treason. NADECO members arrested.
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UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance): NCNC. AG, NEPU.
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Nigerian Election Results 1991-93




Senate House of Reps Abiola
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105 273 151 227
155 625 178 805 47


























































Totals 30 30-1115 ^91 \ 3 1 - 5 7 5
Italics: party with majority of seats. = : two states seats shared equally.
8128720 5848247- 58





























Nigeria. Selected economic statistics 1983-1993



































































































Sources: 1983-1988/9 Forrest, Tables 7.1,7.2,7.3,7.4, 7.5; 1988 (debt) 1990 ff. Smith pp. 666-9
p = projected, e = estimated
Notes:
External debt includes short-term debt up to 1988; 1993 includes $6 b. arrears.
Debt service in 1992 is limited to 30%, but
The estimated 1993 budget deficit compares to the projected $28.6, and amounts to two-thirds of budgeted revenue
and 15% of GDP.
Balance of payments includes services, incomes and transfers and is therefore much lower than the trade balance
(exports • imports). Long-term capital transfers, inc. debt repayments, are excluded.
Oil exports are 96-97% of total exports, 1983-85, between 91and 95% in 1986-89; 96-97% in 1990-92..
Oil R/E is government revenue, in N for 1983-1989; exports in $, for 1990-92.
Money supply is % change over previous year.
For further information, see Forrest Tables 7.1-5, Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports, World Bank, World
Debt Tables.
' Oil revenues are total government revenues from oil.
Budgetary deficit for the first hald of 1993 was N10.4 b. higher than projected.
Sources for Chronology and Tables 1984-1994 :
Tom Forrest Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria, Westview, Boulder, 1993.
A. Wayne ed. Africa South of the Sahara 1994, Europa, London, 1993: Nigeria: Recent History (T.C. McCaskie),
Economy (Patrick Smith).
Africa Concord, National Concord, Financial Times, Guardian (London), Independent, Le Monde, Newswatch,
West Africa. (With thanks to the Library, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford).
